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60 
ENJOYING YOUR “FREE” APP? THE FIRST 
CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO AN OUTDATED 
LAW IN YERSHOV v. GANNETT SATELLITE 
INFORMATION NETWORK, INC. 
Abstract: On April 29, 2016, in Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Information Net-
work, Inc. (“Yershov II”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that 
the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”) of 1988 extended to a free applica-
tion provider who disclosed its users’ GPS coordinates, phone identification 
numbers, and video histories to a data analytics company. In a similar case, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the VPPA did not apply 
because the relationship was too weak to render the user a “subscriber” under the 
Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit––in an opinion immediately 
following Yershov II––also adopted a tentative approach when limiting the 
VPPA’s application to technological innovations. This Comment argues that the 
First Circuit’s application of the VPPA to new technology properly analogized 
the Act in line with its text and legislative intent. Because analogies carry some 
uncertainty and until an agency regulates the area, courts should err on the side of 
upholding consumer privacy rights and focus on transparency. This approach, 
showcased by the First Circuit in Yershov II and hesitated on by the Eleventh and 
Third Circuits, allows for greater predictability in a developing area of the law 
and re-establishes consumer control for online personal information. 
INTRODUCTION 
After renting or purchasing a movie, consumers have a right to have vid-
eo providers keep that information private.1 In 1988, Congress enacted the 
Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA” or the “Act”) creating a civil cause of 
action against providers who reveal an individual’s identity and viewing histo-
ry without consent.2 When approached with a VPPA claim, judges must ensure 
two important elements are met in order for the claim to proceed: (1) the plain-
tiff is a “consumer,” defined as someone who “rent[s],” “purchase[s],” or “sub-
scribe[s to]” the video content; and (2) the provider has disclosed “personally 
identifiable information” sufficient to expose the identity of the viewer.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988) (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012)) (protecting viewers’ privacy and freedom to rent, purchase, 
or subscribe to video providers without their information delivered to another party). 
 2 See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)–(b). Congress specifically wrote the Video Privacy Protection Act 
(“VPPA” or the “Act”) to protect individuals against video providers publicizing their viewing histo-
ry. See S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342-1, 4342-5. 
 3 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)–(b) (stating that video providers will be held liable for disclosing a con-
sumer’s movie history and identity without consent). See generally Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. 
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In April 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Yershov v. 
Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. (“Yershov II”) held that a valid 
VPPA claim existed against a phone application provider who disclosed a us-
er’s GPS coordinates, Android ID number, and viewing history to a data ana-
lytics company without consent.4 The First Circuit reviewed the issue de novo 
and reasoned that the relationship between the user of the free USA Today ap-
plication at issue in the case and the provider of the application resembled a 
cable provider installing a hotline into a user’s home at no cost.5 Additionally, 
the court found that releasing a user’s GPS coordinates functions like a name 
when coupled with today’s search engine technology.6 By contrast, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit previously held that a free applica-
tion downloader was not protected by the VPPA because the relationship be-
tween the downloader and the provider was more akin to opening a favorites 
tab on a website.7 Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
avoided expanding the VPPA by finding that an individual’s computer brows-
ing data is too removed from his or her name to resemble the original protec-
tions of the Act and warrant VPPA protection.8 
This Comment argues that the First Circuit appropriately analogized the 
VPPA’s definitions to a developing area of technology and upheld legislative 
intent to safeguard video privacy rights.9 This Comment further argues that 
until Congress clarifies or assembles an agency to administer the VPPA, judi-
cial discretion should be applied in favor of consumer privacy interests by re-
quiring more transparent disclosures from video providers.10 Part I of this 
Comment examines the factual and procedural history of Yershov II and re-
views the legislative history of the VPPA.11 Part II discusses the different ap-
                                                                                                                           
Network, Inc. (Yershov II), 820 F.3d 482 (1st Cir. 2016) (assessing whether a user of an application 
was a “subscriber” and whether or not the user’s device GPS coordinates and phone identification 
number constituted “personally identifiable information”). 
 4 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 489 (broadening the VPPA to include a claim against phone applica-
tion providers who sell users’ digital information to data analytics companies). 
 5 See id. (analogizing an old technology like a phone hotline with new technology like video 
streaming to gain better understanding of how the VPPA might apply). A “hotline” is a direct line that 
is available to be called, like a landline in a home. Hotline, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hotline [https://perma.cc/2G79-JZDN] (last visited Oct. 4, 2016). 
 6 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 486, 489 (reasoning that the VPPA includes protections for digital 
information that can readily identify an individual, like a home address or jersey number). 
 7 See Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc. (Ellis II), 803 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding the 
relationship between a user of a free application and the application provider too weak to extend 
VPPA protection). 
 8 See In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig. (In re Nickelodeon II), 827 F.3d 262, 269, 284 
(3d Cir. 2016) (finding that the consumers’ digital information was too far removed from the VPPA’s 
protection because a third party could not readily identify the consumers). 
 9 See infra notes 84–93 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 94–102 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 14–54 and accompanying text. 
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proaches taken by the First, Eleventh, and Third Circuits in determining how to 
apply the VPPA to modern technology.12 Lastly, Part III argues that the First Cir-
cuit better approached applying the VPPA by upholding consumer privacy inter-
ests when providers sell their personal data to third parties without consent.13 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE VPPA AND YERSHOV V. GANNETT  
SATELLITE INFORMATION NETWORK, INC. 
Congress enacted the VPPA in 1988 to protect an individual’s right to pri-
vacy with respect to renting, purchasing, and subscribing to “video tapes” or 
analogous audio visual material.14 The VPPA was passed in the wake of the 
tumultuous Supreme Court nomination of then-D.C. Circuit Judge Robert Bork 
after a newspaper exposed two years of his rental history leaked by his local 
video store.15 Even though the rental history was found to be unremarkable, 
Congress found this exposure shocking and created a remedy for consumers 
against video providers who disclose their video transactions without prior 
consent or absent a limited exception.16 In applying the Act, courts have strug-
gled to adapt its traditional verbiage to today’s electronic age, leading to uncer-
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 55–79 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 80–102 and accompanying text. 
 14 See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 102 Stat. at 3195 (declaring that the purpose of the 
VPPA is to uphold personal video privacy). Congress passed the VPPA in line with a series of statutes 
designed to protect an individual’s private information: Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (credit 
score), Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (school records), Tax Reform Act of 1976 
(tax returns), Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (financial records), Privacy Protection Act of 
1980 (journalists and the press), Electronic Funds Transfer Act of 1980 (bank services), Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984 (cable history), and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(phone and email communications). See S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 3. 
 15 See S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 5. After the release of 146 film titles that Judge Bork and his fami-
ly had rented over two years from a video store, Senator Patrick Leahy denounced the disclosure as 
the beginning of a “Big Brother” era that America must “guard against.” Id. at 5–6; see also Andrea 
Peterson, How a Failed Supreme Court Bid Is Still Causing Headaches for Hulu and Netflix, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 27, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/12/27/how-a-
failed-supreme-court-bid-is-still-causing-headaches-for-hulu-and-netflix/ [https://perma.cc/Z6CF-
7AST] (explaining Judge Bork’s contested Supreme Court nomination as the impetus for a news re-
porter requesting and publishing his video information). Ironically, Judge Bork declared that privacy 
itself was not a fundamental right in his opinion in Dronenburg v. Zech in 1984. See 741 F.2d 1388, 
1396–97 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (refusing to extend a right to privacy to a Navy officer’s personal sexual 
activities). 
 16 See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2) (exempting from the VPPA a video provider’s disclosure of per-
sonally identifiable information in limited circumstances, such as directly to the consumer or to third 
parties with a consumer’s written or electronic consent); see also Peterson, supra note 15 (remarking 
how Judge Bork’s publicized rental history did not contain any videos that were damaging to his repu-
tation, but in fact, were rather monotonous). Congress created a civil cause of action for anyone who 
is aggrieved by a violation of the VPPA, and provides for a minimum $2,500 recovery. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2710(c). 
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tainty as to the extent of the VPPA’s online application.17 Section A of this Part 
examines the interpretation of the Act in light of modern video streaming tech-
nology.18 Section B of this Part details Yershov II, in which the First Circuit in 
2016 applied the VPPA to videos watched through a free phone application.19 
A. The VPPA’s Analogical Evolution 
The VPPA creates a civil remedy against video suppliers that intentionally 
release a “consumer[’s]” “personally identifiable information” and film history 
to a third party.20 The VPPA defines “personally identifiable information” as 
information that “identifies a person” and their specific video viewing history 
or requests from a supplier.21 A “consumer” is defined as “any renter, purchas-
er, or subscriber” of the video content.22 
Because the VPPA was enacted in response to Judge Bork’s publicized 
film rental history, it originally focused on protecting persons who rented vid-
eos the old fashioned way—for instance, by going to a Blockbuster.23 The 
1988 legislative history, nonetheless, warns against evolving technology and 
the invasive potential of online companies to profile a consumer.24 In 2012, 
Congress revisited and amended the VPPA to focus on disclosures of online 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 486 (associating “personally identifiable information” with a per-
son’s name, social security number, football jersey number, or phone identification number and GPS 
coordinates); Ellis II, 803 F.3d at 1257 (finding someone who downloads a free application with no 
greater commitment is not a subscriber under the VPPA because this is like “adding a particular web-
site to one’s Internet browser as a favorite”); In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11–03764 LB, 2014 WL 
1724344, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2014) (declaring that video streaming entities may fall under the 
scope of the Act if they release information that is equivalent to a name like cookies that link to a 
user’s Facebook identification); see also Venkat Balasubramani, Important and Troubling Video Pri-
vacy Protection Act (VPPA) Ruling from First Circuit—Yershov v. Gannett, TECH. & MKTG. LAW 
BLOG (May 1, 2016), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/05/important-and-troubling-video-
privacy-protection-act-vppa-ruling-from-first-circuit-yershov-v-gannett.htm [https://perma.cc/9CZ2-
A8HJ] (discussing the unclear legal implications of the First Circuit’s ruling for online video applica-
tion developers resulting in “panic” among app developers). 
 18 See infra notes 20–37 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 38–54 and accompanying text. 
 20 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2012). The VPPA defines a video tape service provider as, “any per-
son, engaged in the business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of rental, sale, or delivery 
of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials, or any person or other entity to 
whom a disclosure is made.” Id. § 2710(a)(4) (emphasis added). An aggrieved consumer can recover 
actual or liquidated damages of $2,500 in addition to punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs, and 
other equitable relief. Id. § 2710(c)(2). 
 21 Id. § 2710(a)(3). 
 22 Id. § 2710(a)(1). 
 23 See id. § 2710(b)(1) (referring to “video tape rental[s]” when discussing the means of watching 
a movie); S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 5 (describing the publication of Judge Bork’s film history as the 
“impetus for [the VPPA] legislation”); see also Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 482 (referring to the VPPA’s 
origination as part of the “brick-and-mortar” world of the past generation). 
 24 See S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 5–6 (classifying future technology that allows companies to profile 
consumers as “Big Brother” behavior). 
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information, making it easier for companies like Netflix and Facebook to obtain 
online consent to share users’ video histories.25 Despite disclosure updates, Con-
gress did not modify the VPPA’s terms from its 1988 language.26 Frustrated that 
the terms of the Act are “awkward and unclear,” courts have resorted to analo-
gizing the Act’s terms to modern viewing methods, but with varying outcomes.27 
While courts generally agree that “personally identifiable information” is 
broad enough to include information beyond a name, such as an address, the 
extent of this coverage is unclear.28 In particular, courts disagree with whether 
or not a device’s identification number or GPS coordinates qualify as a per-
son’s identity covered by the Act.29 In fact, one approach asks whether the 
digital information is similar enough to a person’s name so that no additional 
research is necessary.30 Another approach protects information that indirectly 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2) (allowing companies to meet VPPA requirements for disclosing 
consumer personal information by obtaining online consent); 158 CONG. REC. H6849–51 (Dec. 18, 
2012) (requiring companies to issue disclosures every two years separate from the legal and financial 
agreements in order to obtain online consumer consent for sharing their video history). Netflix lobbied 
heavily for the online consent amendment so that subscribers could use Netflix’s new Facebook appli-
cation to share their video preferences at the click of a button. Julianne Pepitone, New Video Law Lets 
You Share Your Netflix Viewing on Facebook, CNN (Jan. 10, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/
10/technology/social/netflix-vppa-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/N7V6-7V7L]. 
 26 See 18 U.S.C. § 2710; 158 CONG. REC. H6849–51 (clarifying in the legislative history of the 
VPPA’s 2012 amendments that the updates serve to facilitate video providers’ access to online con-
sent and to increase consumer awareness through disclosures, but do not alter the Act’s 1988 terms). 
 27 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 482 (describing the VPPA’s use of the phrase “personally identifia-
ble information” as “awkward and unclear”); Suzanne L. Riopel, The Price of Free Mobile Apps Un-
der the Video Privacy Protection Act, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 115, 129 (2016) (acknowledging the 
sensibility for drafters to broadly define “personally identifiable information” because technology 
advances constantly and would otherwise require regular amendments); supra note 17 (showing how 
courts have applied the VPPA’s outdated verbiage to modern technology). 
 28 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 486 (quoting the Senate Report’s analysis that the word “includes” 
was used intentionally to imply a “minimum, but not exclusive, definition” to encompass all video-
related content) (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 12); see also Joshua Jessen & Priyanka Rajagopalan, 
Teaching an Old Law New Tricks: The 1988 Video Privacy Protection Act in the Modern Era, 85 
U.S.L.W. 329 (2016) (chronicling the differences between court opinions in whether personally iden-
tifiable information requires a device’s ID number, IP address, or both). 
 29 Compare Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 486 (likening an individual’s phone identification number and 
GPS coordinates to a social security number or football jersey number, and holding that they consti-
tuted an identity covered by the Act), with Robinson v. Disney Online, 152 F. Supp. 3d 176, 180–81 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (refusing to identify an individual’s Roku or streaming device’s serial number as 
identifiable information and disagreeing with Yershov II’s “overly expansive” interpretation because 
it indirectly identifies a person). 
 30 See In re Hulu, 2014 WL 1724344, at *14 (characterizing personal identification information 
as that “akin” to a name that links specific people to their video history); see also In re Nickelodeon 
Consumer Privacy Litig. (In re Nickelodeon I), MDL No. 2443 (SRC), 2014 WL 3012873, at *10 
(D.N.J. July 2, 2014), aff’d, 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016) (adopting In re Hulu’s reasoning and holding 
that personal information, “must, without more, itself link an actual person to actual video materials”). 
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identifies a consumer if the plaintiff shows that the third party has the means 
and is expected to identify the consumer.31 
Similarly, courts disagree as to who constitutes a “consumer” protected 
by the Act.32 Unlike the classic 1988 customer who would physically purchase, 
rent, or subscribe to a video provider, modern individuals can stream videos at 
no cost from electronic devices.33 While courts generally agree that a protected 
subscriber does not have to make a monetary payment, they disagree about 
what sort of relationship must be established to come under the Act.34 Whether 
or not to extend VPPA protections to downloaders is a matter of judicial inter-
pretation, hinging on nuanced understandings of modern technology and the 
relationships between providers and consumers.35 
When applying an open-ended, “brick-and-mortar” statute in an electronic 
era, courts rely on analogies and the Act’s purpose to form their interpretations.36 
The First Circuit approached the VPPA in this manner in Yershov II when it was 
asked to determine whether individuals who download a free video phone appli-
                                                                                                                           
 31 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 486 (allowing indirect information to be personally identifiable as 
long as the risk of direct identification is “readily foreseeable”). 
 32 See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1). The Act defines consumer as a “renter, purchaser, or subscriber,” 
but fails to further define subscriber. See id. As a result, judges have resorted to the dictionary defini-
tion of subscriber. See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 487 (defining “subscriber” by reference to Merriam–
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, the American Heritage Dictionary, and the Random House Diction-
ary of the English Language); Ellis II, 803 F.3d at 1255–56 (defining “subscriber” by consolidating 
dictionary definitions from Webster’s New World College Dictionary, the Oxford English Dictionary, 
Black’s Law Dictionary, and Webster’s Third New International Dictionary). 
 33 See Recent Case, Eleventh Circuit Limits the Scope of “Subscriber” for VPPA Protections, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2011 (2016) (exploring the history of viewing habits in light of the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Ellis II to exclude free application downloaders). 
 34 Compare Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 487 (finding persons who downloaded the USA Today’s 
phone application were subscribers under the VPPA because they exchanged their phone identifica-
tion number and GPS coordinates for free video access, even if unaware of this transaction), with Ellis 
II, 803 F.3d at 1256–57 (finding persons who downloaded the Cartoon Network application were not 
subscribers under the VPPA because they did not directly exchange personal information for video 
access and established no ongoing relationship). Ironically, the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on 
reasoning from Yershov I, the District of Massachusetts decision that was later reversed. See Ellis II, 
803 F.3d at 1256 (citing Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. (Yershov I), 104 F. Supp. 3d 
135, 147 (D. Mass. 2015), rev’d, 820 F.3d 482 (1st Cir. 2016)). Therefore, in Yershov II, the First 
Circuit acknowledged a disagreement with the “reasonable inferences” and “impression” of the Ellis 
II court when it found that an exchange did occur between a user and free service provider because 
there was an exchange of digital information. Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 488–89. 
 35 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 489; Ellis II, 803 F.3d at 1256. While the Eleventh Circuit likened 
downloading an application to merely tabbing a website, the First Circuit found the relationship to be 
more significant, like installing a physical hotline at one’s home. Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 489; Ellis II, 
803 F.3d at 1257. 
 36 See supra note 27 (noting various court interpretations of the VPPA, and frustrations with the 
Act’s unclear terminology); see also Luke M. Milligan, Analogy Breakers: A Reality Check on 
Emerging Technologies, 80 MISS. L.J. 1319, 1322–23 (2011) (noting the potential for missteps and 
diverse outcomes when judges use analogies to apply a law to unforeseen technology). 
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cation have a claim under the VPPA as subscribers when their GPS coordinates, 
Android ID, and viewing history are released to a third party.37 
B. The First Circuit Addresses the VPPA’s Modern Application 
In late 2013, Alexander Yershov downloaded a free application, called 
“USA Today Mobile App,” on his Android smartphone that allowed him to 
view videos posted by USA Today.38 The application was distributed by Gan-
nett Satellite Information Network, Inc. free of charge and without requesting a 
user name or email address.39 Nonetheless, each time Mr. Yershov viewed a 
video clip, the application allegedly sent to Adobe Systems the title of the vid-
eo, the device’s Android ID, and his GPS coordinates.40 Using this infor-
mation, Adobe allegedly identifies users by linking them to individualized pro-
files it has constructed from amassing online data.41 Mr. Yershov contends that 
he and other users did not consent to this exchange of information and that 
their identifiable information was unlawfully disclosed to Adobe.42 
Mr. Yershov filed a putative class action against Gannett on July 24, 2014 
in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts for violat-
ing the VPPA.43 Judge Saylor dismissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim based on a finding that Mr. Yer-
shov was not a “subscriber” protected by the VPPA.44 He reasoned that no el-
ements of a subscription were present: Mr. Yershov did not make payments, 
register any personal information, receive recurring deliveries, or have access to 
restricted content.45 Notably, Judge Saylor accepted Mr. Yershov’s argument that 
the GPS coordinates and Android ID were “personally identifiable information” 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 484. 
 38 Yershov I, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 148–49. The district court reviewed the facts in favor of Plaintiff 
because the case was on motion to dismiss. See id. at 137. 
 39 Id. at 138 (emphasizing the lack of information that a user needed to submit to USA Today 
before gaining access to the phone application). 
 40 Id. Yershov alleged that Adobe Systems collected data about a consumer’s online behavior by 
receiving information from companies, like application providers. See id. An Android ID is a “64-bit 
number . . . randomly generated when the user first sets up the device and should remain constant for 
the lifetime of the user’s device.” Id.; see also Settings.Secure, ANDROID DEVELOPERS, https://
developer.android.com/reference/android/provider/Settings.Secure.html#ANDROID_ID [https://
perma.cc/XJ58-F7CJ] (last visited Feb. 3, 2017) (defining Android ID). 
 41 See Yershov I, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 138. Although Gannett argued this connection was too dis-
connected, even if possible, Yershov asserted that Adobe has the capability to personally identify 
users from their Android IDs using its amassed data. See id. at 138, 146. 
 42 Id. at 138. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See id. at 149. 
 45 Id. The court synthesized the following key factors from “subscriber” and “subscription” dic-
tionary definitions: “payment, registration, commitment, delivery, and/or access to restricted content.” 
Id. at 147. 
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protected by the VPPA.46 The court reasoned that a phone’s identifying number 
acts like an address, but is in some circumstances even “more significant.”47 
On appeal, the First Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Kayatta, re-
viewed the factors used by the district court to define “subscriber” and consid-
ered whether a phone’s identifying number and GPS coordinates constituted 
“personally identifiable information.”48 The First Circuit agreed with the dis-
trict court’s finding that according to the facts as pled, Gannett disclosed its 
users’ identities.49 The court, however, reversed the district court’s dismissal 
and remanded the case because, unlike the district court, it found that Mr. Yer-
shov was a subscriber protected by the VPPA.50 In its reasoning, the First Cir-
cuit looked to the plain meaning of “subscribe” and concluded that it applied 
broadly because a subscription is just an arrangement to obtain a product or 
service.51 Moreover, while the First Circuit acknowledged that Congress did 
not alter the 1988 terms in its recent amendments, it reasoned that the Act’s 
already broad definitions should also apply to new technology.52 Thus, it lik-
ened Mr. Yershov downloading a free phone application from Gannett to Gan-
nett installing a free hotline at Mr. Yershov’s home.53 Notably, the First Circuit 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See id. at 146. The court in Yershov I found unpersuasive other district court opinions that con-
strained personal information to “information which must, without more,” connect a video to a specif-
ic individual. See id. at 145 (quoting In re Nickelodeon I, 2014 WL 3012873, at *10). Instead, the 
court found that the VPPA included data that could be linked to an individual, such as a home address, 
social security number, and date of birth. See id. at 146. 
 47 See id. at 141–42 (highlighting that an individual’s phone identification number may contain 
information beyond just a name, such as his or her contacts, pictures, schedule, and bank statements). 
 48 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 484, 486 (affirming the district court’s holding that users had their 
identities disclosed when their GPS coordinates and Android IDs were sold to Adobe because Gannett 
allegedly knew that Adobe had the means to identify them). 
 49 See id. at 486. The First Circuit recognized its decision hinged on “reasonable inferences” from 
the facts as alleged because it analogized old fashioned applications of the VPPA to modern technolo-
gy. See id. at 489. Therefore, the court prefaced its decision by acknowledging that new facts may 
shift these inferences outside of the VPPA’s protection, like if Adobe actually cannot readily identify 
individuals from their digital information. See id. 
 50 Id. at 490. 
 51 See id. at 487. The court considered several dictionary definitions, but found the American 
Heritage Dictionary most on point because it described the process of getting a subscription as an 
agreement to access an electronic product or service. See id. Therefore, the court likened Yershov’s 
direct access to Gannett’s phone application videos to a 1988 citizen’s access to a newspaper from a 
home-delivery service. See id. 
 52 See id. at 488 (reasoning that if Congress intended broad definitions of these terms in their 
1988 physical applications, then those same, broad definitions should also apply in their electronic 
applications). 
 53 See id. at 489. Although the court acknowledged this hypothetical is imperfect because it is 
impractical and expensive, it found the Eleventh Circuit’s comparison of adding a website to one’s 
“favorite” tabs to be less persuasive. See id. 
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confined its analysis to the facts as pled and emphasized that new information 
on remand might alter the court’s inferences to exclude VPPA protection.54 
II. JUDGES STRUGGLE WITH APPLYING THE VIDEO PRIVACY PROTECTION 
ACT TO MODERN VIDEO STREAMING TECHNOLOGY 
With constantly evolving video streaming technology, courts struggle to 
interpret and apply the VPPA’s outdated language while holding fast to Con-
gress’s expressed intent.55 In 2016, in Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Information 
Network, Inc. (“Yershov II”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
extended the VPPA’s provisions to include video privacy protections for USA 
Today’s application users in light of the Act’s plain meaning, analogous fea-
tures, and legislative history.56 Recent diverging VPPA interpretations from the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Third Circuits highlight the un-
predictable nature of the VPPA’s provisions in light of unclear terms and judg-
es’ familiarity with new technology.57 Section A of this Part analyzes the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals 2015 decision in Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc. 
(“Ellis II”) to not apply the VPPA to persons who downloaded an application.58 
Section B examines the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 2016 decision in In re 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 489 (leaving the following questions open for remand: Does Gan-
nett treat its applications and website access differently? Can Adobe identify users as alleged?). Re-
cently, the Supreme Court addressed a plaintiff’s obligation to plead concrete Article III injury before 
bringing suit. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1543 (2016) (finding that Article III re-
quires an injury to be both particularized and concrete for a court to hear a claim against a consumer 
reporting agency for violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act). On remand from Yershov II, the critical 
question was whether Gannett and other providers could dismiss VPPA claims for failure of plaintiffs 
to allege injuries in fact. See Greg Herbers, Post-‘Spokeo,’ More Suits Should Be Vulnerable to Arti-
cle III Standing Attacks, FORBES (June 17, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2016/06/17/post-
spokeo-more-suits-should-be-vulnerable-to-article-iii-standing-attacks/#1582419275f3 [https://perma.
cc/92GH-3HVQ]. On September 2, 2016, the Yershov III district court answered this much anticipated 
Spokeo issue by affirming that there is Article III standing for plaintiffs alleging VPPA privacy viola-
tions even if the effects are intangible. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. (Yershov III), 
No. 14-13112-FDS, 2016 WL 4607868, at *1 (D. Mass. 2016); see also In re Nickelodeon II, 827 
F.3d at 262 (finding Article III standing for plaintiffs alleging VPPA violations). 
 55 See, e.g., In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig. (In re Nickelodeon II), 827 F.3d 262, 
283–84 (3d Cir. 2016) (expressing the unclear and flexible nature of the VPPA); Yershov v. Gannett 
Satellite Info. Network, Inc. (Yershov II), 820 F.3d 482, 486 (1st Cir. 2016) (describing part of the 
VPPA as “awkward and unclear”); Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc. (Ellis II), 803 F.3d 1251, 1255 
(11th Cir. 2015) (acknowledging the divided district court applications of the VPPA). 
 56 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 488 (deciding that if Congress applied a broad definition in the 
physical rental era, then the present video streaming era should also apply a broad interpretation). 
 57 See In re Nickelodeon II, 827 F.3d at 281–84 (defining “personally identifiable information” 
narrowly in holding that an IP address, browser setting, and personal computer number do not suf-
fice); Ellis II, 803 F.3d at 1252 (finding someone who simply downloaded an application to stream 
videos lacked a sufficient relationship to be a “subscriber” under the VPPA). 
 58 See infra notes 60–70 and accompanying text. 
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Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation to restrict the VPPA when uncertain 
as to what extent an individual’s digital information is personally identifying.59 
A. Eleventh Circuit: Downloading a Phone Application Does Not Make 
Someone a “Subscriber” Under the VPPA 
In October 2015, the Eleventh Circuit in Ellis II held that an individual who 
merely downloads a free phone application is not a “subscriber” under the 
VPPA.60 In that case, an individual downloaded a free application from Cartoon 
Network in order to watch television episodes and clips from his phone.61 With-
out acquiring consent, the Cartoon Network app collected each user’s viewing 
history and submitted it to a third party data analytics company along with the 
phone’s identification number.62 Users did not create an account, make payments 
to Cartoon Network, register, or create a profile.63 The court also took note of the 
fact that users could remove the app from their devices at anytime.64 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that mere users of the Cartoon 
Network app had an insufficient connection to the application provider to be 
considered a “subscriber.”65 To define “subscriber,” which was left undefined 
in the VPPA, the Eleventh Circuit scoured dictionaries in search of the word’s 
plain meaning.66 The Eleventh Circuit determined that the district court of 
Massachusetts’s multi-factored analysis in Yershov I correctly limited the 
scope of “subscriber” as would have been applicable in 1988, because recent 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See infra notes 71–79 and accompanying text. 
 60 See Ellis II, 803 F.3d at 1252. Although the complaint on appeal asks the court to define who is 
a “subscriber” and what constitutes “personally identifiable information,” the circuit court only ad-
dressed the former issue because it concluded that the application downloader was not a subscriber. 
See id. Nonetheless, the district court did rule on what constitutes personally identifiable information. 
See Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc. (Ellis I), No. 1:14-CV-484-TWT, 2014 WL 5023535, at *3 (N.D. 
Ga. Oct. 8, 2014). Although not precedent because the Eleventh Circuit did not decide the issue, the 
district court found that a user’s phone identification number sent to a data analytics company was not 
personally identifiable information because, unlike a name, further action is required to identify the 
particular individual. See id. 
 61 See Ellis II, 803 F.3d at 1253. 
 62 See id. at 1254. The phone identification number in this case was an Android ID, which is a 
specific 64-bit number provided at the time a user purchases and operates an Android. See id. 
 63 See id. at 1257. 
 64 See id. (demonstrating the weak relationship between the consumer and provider while also 
suggesting that the consumer maintains control over the interaction). 
 65 See id. The Eleventh Circuit’s classification of the relationship between an application down-
loader and free video supplier as weak has been contested as a poor understanding of the technology. 
See Recent Case, supra note 33 (disagreeing with the Ellis II court by finding that downloading a 
phone application indicates a strong commitment to use the service). 
 66 See Ellis II, 803 F.3d at 1255–56 (using definitions from Webster’s New World College Dic-
tionary, the Oxford English Dictionary, Black’s Law Dictionary, and Webster’s Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary to define “subscriber”). 
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amendments did not modify the relevant terms.67 Thus, the court’s decision 
hinged on the relationship it understood to be formed when a person down-
loads a free phone application.68 Judge Jordan, writing for the court in Ellis II, 
analogized downloading a free application to creating an internet browser tab to 
allow faster access to one’s favorite website.69 Based on this analogy, the court 
reasoned that the Cartoon Network app user had a weak connection to the video 
supplier, and thus, was not sufficiently committed to be a “subscriber.”70 
B. Third Circuit: Browsing Data Is Not “Personally Identifiable 
Information” Under the VPPA 
In June 2016, the Third Circuit held in In re Nickelodeon Privacy Litiga-
tion that digital information such as a user’s IP address does not constitute 
“personally identifiable information” protected under the VPPA.71 The Plain-
tiffs were children under the age of thirteen who visited Nickelodeon’s website 
and registered their birthdate and gender in order to access games and stream 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See id. at 1256–57 (quoting Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. (Yershov I), 104 
F. Supp. 3d 147, 149 (D. Mass. 2015), rev’d, 820 F.3d 482 (1st Cir. 2016)) (finding that subscriptions 
generally require these elements: fee, registration, relationship to supplier, distribution, and/or access 
to private content); see also Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entm’t LLC, 98 F. Supp. 3d 662, 669 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (focusing on the commitment or continuing relationship a subscriber maintains with 
a supplier). Ironically, on appeal in Yershov II, the First Circuit disagreed with the Yershov I district 
court’s inferences and application of the term that Ellis II cited in its reasoning. See Yershov II, 820 
F.3d at 488–89. Rather, the First Circuit concluded that “subscriber” could include persons who 
download a free application if there is an exchange of personal digital information and services be-
tween the user and the provider. See id. 
 68 See Ellis II, 803 F.3d at 1257 (viewing an application downloader who pays no fee and requires 
no continued relationship with a video supplier to access video content as insufficient to establish a 
subscriber relationship under the VPPA). District courts have applied similar facts differently under 
the VPPA when determining the relationship between free video streaming content providers and 
users. Compare Yershov I, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 146–49 (finding that someone who downloaded a free 
application on a phone without a greater commitment was not a subscriber), and Austin-Spearman, 98 
F. Supp. 3d at 668–69 (holding that viewing a website and watching videos without further relation to 
the provider did not make a subscriber), with Locklear v. Dow Jones & Co., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 
1316 (N.D. Ga. 2015), abrogated by Ellis II, 803 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that a subscriber 
included someone who visited and watched video content on a website). 
 69 Ellis II, 803 F.3d at 1257. 
 70 Id. at 1257–58. 
 71 See In re Nickelodeon II, 827 F.3d at 262. Recent online tracking techniques like placing a 
“cookie” on an advertisement to collect a user’s browsing data has led to concerns that companies 
have access to everything about a particular user without needing a direct name. See Paul M. Schwartz 
& Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Infor-
mation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1850–51 (2011) (offering an approach to classifying “personally 
identifiable information” that accounts for the risk of accumulated data and technology advancements 
over time); Kate Crawford, When Big Data Marketing Becomes Stalking: Data Brokers Cannot Be 
Trusted to Regulate Themselves, SCI. AM. (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
when-big-data-marketing-becomes-stalking1/ [https://perma.cc/A2MM-8ESH] (suggesting that al-
most any digital information given to a data analytics company is personal). 
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videos.72 Viacom, the service provider, delivered to Google the children’s vid-
eo history, IP addresses, browser data, and unique computer number, which 
allegedly allowed Google to identify the children personally.73 
On appeal, the Third Circuit recognized the VPPA’s uncertain applicability, 
and provided a range of examples that it believed fell into, in between, or out of 
the VPPA’s protection.74 Judge Fuentes, who wrote the opinion, acknowledged 
the fact-sensitive nature of this spectrum and emphasized that what constitutes 
identifiable information is in constant “flux” with new technology.75 The Third 
Circuit noted that Congress had the opportunity to re-define or clarify “personal-
ly identifiable information” in its 2012 amendments but did not, and therefore 
concluded that the court should confine the terms to a more narrow 1988 con-
nection.76 As a result, the Third Circuit found the children’s digital information 
too far removed from their names to warrant protection.77 
Although the First Circuit’s recent decision in Yershov II encouraged a 
broader application of personally identifiable information, the Third Circuit 
distinguished the two cases on their facts, stating that its holding is not a split 
from the First Circuit.78 Ultimately, the Third Circuit left open the possibility 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See In re Nickelodeon II, 827 F.3d at 267–68. 
 73 See id. at 282. The Third Circuit constructed a balancing test in which some types of personal 
information proved more similar than others to the 1988 example of giving an individual’s name. See 
id. at 282–83. 
 74 See id. at 282–83 (finding information like a person’s name to be the most clearly identifying, 
while a phone number, home or work address, social security number, and digital identifiers were of 
less certain protection under the VPPA). 
 75 See id. at 284. 
 76 See id. at 286. In its 2012 amendments to the VPPA, Congress did not update the 1988 defini-
tions for “consumer” and “personally identifiable information,” but maintained the same 1988 terms. 
See 158 CONG. REC. H6849–51 (Dec. 18, 2012). Instead, Congress amended the statute to clarify that 
consumer consent in the VPPA can be obtained over the internet but must be re-obtained every two 
years. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(A) (2012). Although courts, including the First Circuit in Yer-
shov II, still use the quintessential 1988 brick-and-mortar analogy to apply the Act to new technology, 
the Third Circuit’s application requires an even tighter connection between the two. Compare In re 
Nickelodeon II, 827 F.3d at 284 (explaining that the 1988 legislature most likely intended to restrict 
the VPPA’s application to situations similar to the initial impetus for the Act––a video store releasing 
a customer’s video history), with Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 486 (finding that Congress intended a broad 
application of the statute by not limiting the Act to mere names). 
 77 See In re Nickelodeon II, 827 F.3d at 289. 
 78 See id. (“Nor does our decision today create a split with our colleagues in the First Circuit.”). 
The Third Circuit distinguished itself from Yershov II because Google did not receive any GPS coor-
dinates in addition to the digital information provided. See id. The court was also concerned about 
holding Google liable merely because it hypothetically had the capability to identify users through the 
consumer’s supplied digital data and its own resources. See id. at 290. By contrast, the First Circuit in 
Yershov II found this same argument persuasive that Adobe could predictably use its resources to link 
not only a user’s GPS coordinates but also its device information to a particular individual. See Yer-
shov II, 820 F.3d at 486. 
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for modern applications of the VPPA, but only for those with a tight link to the 
brick-and-mortar system.79 
III. REDIRECTING THE VPPA IN LIGHT OF CONGRESSIONAL  
INTENT AND CONSUMER PRIVACY INTERESTS 
Unlike the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s interpretation of 
the ambiguous VPPA with its emphasis on consumer protection, the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Third Circuits’ reserved application 
gives providers the benefit of the doubt and opens the Act up to circumven-
tion.80 To begin, this Part contends that the First Circuit’s 2016 reasoning in 
Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. (“Yershov II”) properly 
interpreted an outdated statute in a developing area of the law.81 Next, this Part 
argues that while analogies can be helpful tools for applying outdated technical 
laws, they can also lead to unpredictable results depending on the court’s fa-
miliarity with the underlying technology.82 Finally, this Part argues that in light 
of the VPPA’s evident purpose to protect consumer video privacy and Con-
gress’s recent amendments, courts should err on the side of requiring video 
application providers to obtain online consent and disclose personal data trans-
actions.83 
First, the First Circuit’s reasoning in Yershov II used fundamental canons of 
statutory interpretation to properly expand the scope of the VPPA beyond the 
1988 brick-and-mortar application and into modern video privacy concerns.84 
Beginning with the VPPA’s text, the First Circuit noted that Congress allotted for 
judicial discretion by not defining “subscriber,” and by establishing that personal 
information “includes” identifying a person.85 The word “includes” indicates a 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See In re Nickelodeon II, 827 F.3d at 284. For instance, Judge Fuentes predicted that if 
YouTube provided a third party with a subscriber’s video history, that would sufficiently resemble 
Judge Bork’s local video store releasing his rental history to fall under the VPPA. See id. at 286. 
 80 Compare In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig. (In re Nickelodeon II), 827 F.3d 262, 284 
(3d Cir. 2016) (stating that if an average person cannot readily connect certain information to a specif-
ic individual, then it should not be protected under the VPPA), and Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc. 
(Ellis II), 803 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 2015) (characterizing the relationship between an applica-
tion user and video provider as weak and so forfeiting VPPA protection), with Yershov v. Gannett 
Satellite Info. Network, Inc. (Yershov II), 820 F.3d 482, 488 (1st Cir. 2016) (emphasizing that applica-
tion users for USA Today did not receive disclosures asking for consent before their information was 
distributed to a data analytics company). 
 81 See infra notes 84–93 and accompanying text. 
 82 See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 83 See infra notes 98–102 and accompanying text. 
 84 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483–84 (2015) (stating that statutory interpretation 
begins and ends with the text when the statute is clear, but in cases of ambiguity, a court must assess 
the text in context); Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 487–88 (beginning with the VPPA’s text and plain mean-
ing before consulting legislative history). 
 85 Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 486–88; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1)–(3) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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range of applicable identifying methods.86 Thus, the First Circuit recognized that 
even though users downloaded the USA Today application at no monetary cost, it 
still cost them their device numbers, GPS locations, and video history, all of 
which served some value to Gannett.87 Likewise, the court recognized that a de-
vice’s GPS coordinates often link a person to his or her home and work address, 
allowing for easy identification.88 Without consenting to providers selling their 
information, users paid this price unknowingly.89 
Although the VPPA’s legislative history is not critical to this result, it is per-
suasive.90 In 2012, Congress revisited the statute to facilitate video providers’ 
access to online consent, but clarified that it did not broaden the scope of the Act 
beyond the 1988 version.91 The Third Circuit interpreted Congress’s disclaimer 
to mean that the Act should be narrowly applied, when in fact, the 1988 legisla-
tive history warned against a “Big Brother” era in which emerging technology 
allows companies to compile an individual’s interests, habits, and dislikes into a 
personal profile.92 Thus, the First Circuit stayed true to the 100th Congress’s in-
                                                                                                                           
 86 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 486 (citing In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st. Cir. 2015)) (finding 
that the word “includes” expands rather than constricts the statute’s application to examples that are 
not expressly provided). 
 87 See id. at 489; see also Natalia Drozdiak, EU Mulls New Rules on Data Collection, WALL ST. 
J. (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-mulls-new-rules-on-data-collection-1456386051 
[https://perma.cc/6KXE-QR78] (discussing competition in the international marketplace for consumer 
data). 
 88 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 486 (highlighting the logical assumption that a large data analytics 
company like Adobe has the mechanisms and is likely to link users’ GPS coordinates and device 
numbers to specific individuals). 
 89 See Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/ 
[https://perma.cc/RS88-HYXG]. The Pew Research Center conducted surveys with 607 adults and 
found that on average, 91% “agree” or “strongly agree” that online consumers have “lost control” of 
their online personal information to companies. See id. 
 90 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 487–88 (beginning with the VPPA’s text and plain dictionary defi-
nition, the First Circuit developed the presumed meaning of “subscriber” before consulting the Act’s 
legislative history to confirm Congress’s intention). See generally Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary 
Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613 (2014) 
(arguing that legislative history communicates the context of a statute crucial to the decision-making 
process). Legislative history serves to anchor the judges’ decision in Congress’s meaning rather than 
allowing judges to “write the law that they want.” See id. at 1620. 
 91 See 158 CONG. REC. H6849–51 (Dec. 18, 2012) (stating expressly that the 1988 terms not be 
impacted by the 2012 consent amendments). The Third Circuit reasons that because Congress did not 
update the VPPA’s ambiguous terms, its definitions should be narrowly construed around the 1988 
beliefs of personal information and video consumers. In re Nickelodeon II, 827 F.3d at 288. Nonethe-
less, legislative inaction has been considered an unreliable means for understanding legislative intent 
and should cautiously be applied to statutory interpretation. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting 
Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 94 (1988) (analyzing the function of legislative inaction in 
statutory interpretation and arguing that it does not reveal actual legislative intent, but a presumed 
one). 
 92 See In re Nickelodeon II, 827 F.3d at 288 (tying the VPPA closely to the physical video rental 
space); see also S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342-1, 4342-5 
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tent by protecting users from a video provider selling their viewing history and 
personal information to a data analytics company without their consent.93 
Without more direction from Congress or an administrative agency, courts 
must interpret vague statutory terms in a developing area of the law by relying 
in part on a court’s familiarity with the technology itself.94 As a result, key pri-
vacy concerns hinge on inferences, leading to unpredictable results.95 Both 
providers and consumers are negatively impacted by such ambiguous liability 
and fact-sensitive inquiries.96 Not only may consumers lose an important pri-
vacy right, but this uncertainty in the law also threatens the productivity of 
new technology developers who struggle to follow outdated statutes or to pre-
dict how a judge will view their product.97 
In light of the foundational privacy right Congress sought to protect, courts 
should be more willing to infer ambiguities in favor of safeguarding consumers’ 
                                                                                                                           
(anticipating a future similar to today’s reality where an individual’s preferences are compiled online 
by third parties). 
 93 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 488 (declaring that Congress constructed a broad video privacy law 
in 1988 and the VPPA does not require any degree less of protection in the digital world). 
 94 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 806 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring) (warning 
courts to consider carefully the potential societal consequences of new technology and to be weary of 
analogizing to “familiar” technology while ignoring key differences); Schwartz & Solove, supra note 
71, at 1845–46 (explaining the unpredictable climate surrounding changing technology and difficulty 
of trying to formulate a definition for “personally identifiable information”). 
 95 See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 489 (likening the relationship between Gannett and Yershov to a 
provider installing a “hotline” at a user’s home, and so was the type of relationship that fell under the 
VPPA’s protection); Ellis II, 803 F.3d at 1257 (finding that the relationship fell out of the VPPA’s 
protection because it was more similar to creating a “favorites” tab on an internet home page). The 
Third Circuit distinguished itself from the First Circuit by clarifying that, unlike in Yershov II where 
the consumer’s GPS coordinates were disclosed to a provider allowing even an average person to 
identify a user, in In re Nickelodeon II, solely the users’ digital information was disclosed making it 
more removed from their specific identities. See In re Nickelodeon II, 827 F.3d at 289. 
 96 See Balasubramani, supra note 17 (discussing the unclear legal implications of the First Cir-
cuit’s ruling for online video application developers, resulting in “pani[c]”). As the Third Circuit not-
ed, had the users’ GPS coordinates been disclosed as in Yershov II, then the sliding scale might have 
moved in favor of protecting the information under the VPPA as their personal identities. See In re 
Nickelodeon II, 827 F.3d at 289. The court in Yershov II also carefully narrowed its opinion to the 
facts as pled and left open the possibility that further fact-finding may shift the court’s inferences to 
not extend VPPA protection. See Yershov II, 820 F.3d at 489. 
 97 See Balasubramani, supra note 17 (discussing the alarm the Yershov II decision may have on 
application providers who are uncertain if their disclosures to third party data analytic companies 
require consent). On October 27, 2016, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) adopted 
regulations to help consumers understand and control what personal information is tracked and gath-
ered by broadband internet service providers. See Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband 
and Other Telecommunications Services, 81 Fed. Reg. 87,274 (Dec. 2, 2016) (to be codified at 47 
C.F.R. pt. 64). The FCC order requires internet service providers to receive affirmative consumer 
consent before disclosing “personally identifiable information” such as their “email address or other 
online contact information; phone numbers; MAC addresses or other unique device identifies; IP 
addresses; and persistent online or unique advertising identifiers” to a third party. See id. at 87,285. 
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privacy interests rather than video providers.98 Because Congress made it easier 
for providers to obtain consent, courts should focus on requiring disclosures 
about what private information is being tracked and sold to third parties.99 Dis-
closures are a critical, if not the most critical, way to combat privacy inva-
sions.100 As the First Circuit noted, consumers of a “free” application pay a price 
by forfeiting their device information, GPS location, and viewing history to a 
third party.101 By notifying consumers of the information to be shared, providers 
can manage their liability, and consumers can know what costs they are paying, 
thus, regaining control over their personal video information.102 
CONCLUSION 
When applying the outdated VPPA to modern technology, judges must re-
sort to analogies that can bridge the gap between Congress’s intended protec-
tions and modern viewing methods. This mode of interpretation, however, 
must be exercised with deference to Congress’s original intent to protect con-
sumer privacy. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stayed true to 
the text and purpose of the VPPA in Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Information 
Network, Inc. by increasing consumer control in the online rental space. 
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